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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

vs.
Case No. 880395 CA
JOSEPH MORITSKY,
Defendant and
Appellant.
Jurisdiction for review is conferred upon this court by
Section 78-2(a)-3, Utah Code Ann., and Article 8, Sections 4 and
9, Utah State Constitution.
Defendant herein was charged with aggravated assault, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann., Section
76-5-103, and was convicted in a jury trial on July 23, 1987, in
the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Uintah County,
State of Utah.
DATED this

"Z3

day of August, 1988.
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Attorney for Defend;
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

:
Case No. 880395 CA

vs.
JOSEPH MORITZSKY,
Defendant and
Appellant.

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.
Whether

trial counsel's

objective standard of reasonable
so,

whether

counsel's

representation
professional

performance

was

fell below an

judgment, and if

prejudicial

to

the

defendant, thereby denying his right to effective assistance of
counsel.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Joseph Moritzsky was charged with aggravated
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
Section 76-5-103.
Defendant was convicted in a jury trial held July 23,
1987, in the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Uintah
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dennis Draney, presiding.
Defendant was sentenced by Judge Draney to be confined

in the

Utah

State

Prison

for

a term

of

not

more

than

five

years.

Execution of the prison sentence was suspended and the defendant
was placed on probation for a period of eighteen months on the
conditions and terms that:
(1) he enter into and abide by terms of a probation
agreement with the Department of Corrections;
(2) that the defendant violate no laws of the United
States, State of Utah or any municipality during the term of the
probation;
(3) that the defendant

serve one year

in the Uintah

County jail;
(4) that the defendant submit himself to and complete
any psychological evaluation as requested by the Department

of

Corrections

as

and

participate

in

counselling

and

therapy

required by said Department, and pay appropriate restitution.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about April 1, 1987, defendant was residing in a
trailer in Uintah County, State of Utah.
that

afternoon,

trailer.

the

defendant

had

several

One of the visitors was Gary

partner is a horse-breaking venture.
invited

Mr.

trailer

for a

defendant's

Olsen,

and

drink.

other

several
Tr.

guests

Tr. at 128, 130.

Olsen, the

Tr. at 54.

other
133.

Shortly

left

the

trailer,

Tr. at 64.

defendant

that he was going

at

his

defendant's

The defendant

individuals

at

remained.

visitors

Late

inside

the

thereafter,

the

but

Mr.

Olsen

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Olsen informed the
to take home the

mare

which

the

defendant had been breaking.

TR at 60, 134.

The defendant then

told Mr. Olsen that he would not let him take the mare home.

TR

at 60, 135.

The defendant then went inside the trailer, just

before dark.

TR at 135.

The defendant testified that shortly

after he went to sleep, he could
heard a noise in the trailer.

feel the trailer moving

and

He left the bedroom of the trailer

to find that Mr. Olsen had broken the rope which was securing the
outside door of the trailer, and Olsen was in his trailer.
at 136-137.

The defendant and Mr. Olsen struggled and defendant

pushed Mr. Olsen out of the trailer door and onto the
Tr. at 165.

Tr.

ground.

Mr. Olsen testified that he then immediately went

back into the trailer and upon doing so, saw the defendant go to
get his gun.

TR at 62.

The defendant fired several shots toward

Mr. Olsen's feet, and one bullet hit Mr. Olsen's foot.
then

left

the

camp

trailer,

approximately twenty minutes.

but

remained

TR at 70.

Olsen

outside

for

The defendant remained

in his trailer for an additional period of time, and then went
outside and gave Mr. Olsen a ride to his home.

TR at 72.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant Joseph Moritzsky claims that he was

denied

his right to effective assistance of counsel at his trial because
his attorney did not request

jury instructions affording him the

statutory presumption that his use of force was reasonable, as
the

victim's

entry

into

his

trailer

home

was

unlawful

and

forcible.
In support of his contention, defendant relies upon the
testimony

of

the

victim,

Gary

Olsen,

who

testified

that

the

defendant physically removed him

from

defendant's

trailer, and

Mr. Olsen again re-entered the trailer in a forceful manner.
Defendant asserts that his attorney's failure to argue
the statutory
habitation

presumption

statute

made

of reasonableness
proper

in the

application

of

defense of

his

statutory

defense impossible.
ARGUMENT

POINT 1

DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND BY ARTICLE ONE, SECTION TWELVE OF THE UTAH
STATE CONSTITUTION.
In Strickland
2052

(1984),

standard

the

for

United

States

Supreme

evaluating

claims

of

counsel

at

satisfy

a two pronged

counsel's
reasonable

v. Washington,

trial.

In

order
test.

representation
professional

fell

to

466 U.S. 668, 104
Court

the

First, he must
below

judgment.

established

ineffective

prevail,

an

he

counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant.

the

assistance

of

defendant

must

demonstrate

that

objective

Second,

S.Ct

standard

must

show

I_d. at 690.

of
that
In

Codianna v. Morris, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Strickland
standard.

660 P.2d 1101, 1108-09 (Utah 1983).

See also, State

v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986), State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645
(Utah 1985) .
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, the
defendant must show that "specific, identified acts or omissions

fall

outside

assistance."

the

wide

range

Frame at 405.

of

professionally

competent

The defendant herein contends that

trial counsel's failure to request a jury instruction containing
the statutory defense of habitation presumption found in section
76-2-405(2), Utah Code Ann., constitutes a gross omission which
falls below the standard of professionally competent assistance.
Further, trial counsel's failure to request an instruction or to
argue for a finding that the entry into the defendant's home was
unlawful and forcible is also an omission which demonstrates that
counsel's performance was deficient.
this

case

demonstrates

the

vital

A review of the facts of
significance

of

the

legal

presumption of reasonableness.
The defendant testified that after he went to bed, he
felt the trailer move and heard a noise.

Upon going into the

other room of the trailer, he saw Olsen in his trailer. Tr. at
136-137.

He

further

testified

that

to

gain

trailer home, Olsen had broken a rope which
Tr. at 137.

and

re-entered

secured

into

the door.

that

the

Indeed, the uncontroverted testimony of the
of

the

defendant's

"victim",
home,

Olsen,

again,

was

after

that

Olsen

defendant

pushed him out of the door of the trailer. Tr. at 61, 139.
was

the

his

Defendant and Olsen struggled and defendant pushed

him out the door.
defendant

entry

physical

confrontation

and

Olsen's

re-entry

of

had
It
the

trailer that caused defendant to get his gun and fire it several
times towards Olsen's feet.
In
respecting

1985,

the

the defense

Tr. at 62, 140.

legislature
of

amended

habitation,

Utah

the

Utah

statute

Code

Ann.

Section

76-2-405,

to

76-2-405(2).

add

the

legal

presumption

found

in

Section

That Subsection states:

The person using force or deadly force in
defense of habitation is presumed for the
purpose of both civil and criminal cases
to have acted reasonably and had a reasonable
fear of imminent peril of death or serious
bodily injury if the entry or attempted
entry is unlawful and is made or attempted
by use of force, or in a violent and tumultuous
manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or
for the purpose of committing a felony.
The Supreme Court of Utah

in

the

case

of

State

in

Interest of R.J.Z., 736 P.2d 235 (Utah 1987), held that by adding
Subsection (2), the legislature intended a legal presumption of
reasonableness

whenever

an

entry

is

"unlawful"

and

"made

or

attempted by use of force, or in a violent and tumultuous manner,
or

surreptitiously

or

committing a felony."

by

stealth,

or

for

the

purpose

of

The Court further held that a finding as

to whether the entry was unlawful and forcible is essential to
the proper application of Section 76-2-405, and remanded the case
for factual findings as to whether the entry into R.J.Z.'s

home

was unlawful and forcible, or otherwise qualifies under Section
76-2-405(2) for a legal presumption of reasonableness.
236.

In other words, Subsection

(2), in the

Id. at

immediate case,

provides a sound legal defense for the defendant's conduct.
essence

of

this

case

is

the

propriety

of

the

defense

The
of

habitation.
In the case at bar, trial counsel did not argue that
the entry was unlawful or forcible and did not pursue a finding
on

that

issue;

did

not

request

an

instruction

regarding

the

statutory presumption of reasonableness; and did not object to
the instructions
instruction

given, even though the

given

Subsection (1).

did

not

reflect

defense of

the

1985

habitation

amendment

to

(Full text of defense of habitation and property

instructions given set forth in Addendum).

In light of the facts

of this case, defendant contends that these specific omissions by
trial

counsel

render

his

performance

outside

the

range

of

professionally competent assistance.
To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, the
Defendant must show that trial counsel's
prejudiced

the

defense.

^d.

at

deficient

2064.

This

performance

requires

defendant to show that a "reasonable probability"

the

exists that,

but for counsel's error, the result would have been different.
Frame at 405.

A reasonable probability has been defined as that

"sufficient to undermine the confidence in the reliability of the
verdict."

State v. Lariby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1204-06 (Utah 1984).
Defendant contends that there

probability

in

this

case

that, but

is indeed

for

counsel's

a reasonable
error,

the

result in this case would have been different.
In State in Interest of R.J.Z., (supra), the

Supreme

Court of Utah noted that:
the first step in deciding whether any defendant
is justified under section 76-2-405 is to determine
what burden of proof the defendant and the State
are respectively required to carry. It is impossible
to allocate the burden of proof without first
determining whether the defendant is entitled to
the statutory presumption.
Id. at 237.
Therefore,

it

follows

that

for

the

statute

to

be

properly applied, a determination as to the nature and legality
of

Olsen's

entry

into

the

defendant's

home

is

required

in

determining whether the defendant is entitled to the benefit of a
legal presumption.
done, either by

Trial counsel did not request that this be

instruction

or by

argument,

even

though

this

defense is central to the defendant's case.
The

failure

distinguishable

from

of
the

trial

counsel

general

in

complaints

this

action

is

about

counsel

in

Frame, supra, and in State v. Pursifell, 72 U.A.R. 38 (Utah App.
In those cases, the defendants1 complaints about their

1987).

respective attorneys1 performance were general and were found not
to be prejudicial to the defense.

However, the allegations of

error are specific and substantial in this case, and constitute
the heart of the defense.
impossible

without

The proper resolution of the case was

the

statutory

defense

instructions regarding the presumption.

and

specific

e.g., R.J.Z., supra.

The Utah Supreme Court in Frame, supra, noted that the
principles
counsel

applied

claims

in

are

evaluating

guides

to

ineffective

the

ultimate

fundamental fairness of Defendant's trial.

assistance
focus

on

of
the

The Court stated that

"the purpose of the inquiry is simply to insure that defendant
receives a fair trial."
that

his

issues

of

counsel's
his

Id.,

at 405.

critical

defense

Here, the defendant asserts

omissions

denied

him

regarding

the

right

assistance of counsel as required by the Sixth
Amendments to the

the

central

to

effective

and

Fourteenth

Constitution of the United States, and Article

I, Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.

CONCLUSION
The conviction of the defendant for aggravated assault
should

be

vacated

and

this

case

should

be

remanded

to

the

district court for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

day of August, 1988.

N. PAPPAS
"Attorney for D

Certificate of Filing and Service
Pursuant to Rule 26, R. Utah Ct. App. ,
do hereby
certify that on the z ^
day of August, 1988,
_^ww, ^ filed
^^^^^ an
original and seven copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant,
and served four copies upon David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General,
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, by mailing said
briefs, postage prepaid.

ADDENDUM

f76-2-405.

Utah Code Ann.
Force in defense of habitation.

(1)

A person is justified in using force against

another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that
the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other's
unlawful entry into or attack upon his habitation; however, he is
justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury only if:
(a)

the entry is made or attempted in a violent and

tumultuous manner, surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he
reasonably believes that the entry is attempted or made for the
purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to any
person, dwelling, or being in the habitation and he reasonably
believes that the force is necessary to prevent the assault or
offer of personal violence; or
(b)

he reasonably believes that the entry is made or

attempted for the purpose of committing a felony in the
habitation and that the force is necessary to prevent the
commission of the felony.
(2)

The person using force or deadly force in defense

of habitation is presumed for the purpose of both civil and
criminal cases to have acted reasonably and had a reasonable fear
of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury if the entry
or attempted entry is unlawful and is made or attempted by use of
force, or in a violent and tumultuous manner, or surreptitiously
or by stealth, or for the purpose of committing a felony.

#76-2-406.

Utah Code Ann.
Force in defense of property.

A person is justified in using force, other than deadly
force, against another when and to the extent that he reasonably
believes that force is necessary to prevent or terminate criminal
interference with real property or personal property:
(1)

Lawfully in his possession; or

(2)

Lawfully in the possession of a member of his

immediate family; or
(3)

Belonging to a person whose property he has a

legal duty to protect.

INSTRUCTION NO.
You are instructed that a person is justified in
threatening or using force against another person when and to the
extent he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to
defend himself against other such person's imminent use of such
unlawful force; however, a person is justified in using force
which is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury only if he reasonably believes that the force is necessary
to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself.
Actual danger is not necessary to justify self-defense
if one is confronted by the appearance of peril which arouses in
his mind an honest and reasonable conviction and fear that he is
about to suffer death or great bodily harm and if a reasonable
man in a like situation, seeing and knowing the same facts, would
be justified in believing himself in such danger.
If a person so confronted acts in self-defense upon
such appearance and from such fear or honest conviction, his
right to self-defense is the same whether such danger is real or
apparent.
Now, you will note that such fear and apprehension must
be honest and reasonable in light of all of the circumstances,
and to justify the right of self-defense not only must a person
act on facts and circumstances that he himself believes place him
in deadly peril of his life or receiving great bodily harm, but
also that a reasonable man if in the same situation would
likewise be justified in believing himself in such danger.

INSTRUCTION NO.
A person is justified in the use of force against
another which is intended or likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury when and to the extent that he reasonably believes
that the force that is necessary to prevent the other's unlawful
entry into or attack upon his habitation, but only if, (a), the
entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner,
surreptitiously or by stealth and he reasonably believes the
entry is made for the purpose of assaulting or offering any
violence to any person dwelling or being in the habitation and he
reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent the
assault or offer of personal violence, or (b), he reasonably
believes that the entry is made or attempted for the purpose of
committing a felony in the habitation and that the force is
necessary to prevent the commission of the felony.

INSTRUCTION NO.
You1re instructed that the laws of the State of Utah do
not require a defendant to establish self-defense or defense of
habitation by preponderance or greater weight of the evidence.
The laws of the State of Utah require the defendant to bring
forward some evidence which tends to show self-defense.
If the defendant has done this and if such evidence of
self-defense, when considered in connection with all other
evidence in this case, raises a reasonable doubt as to whether
the defendant acted in self-defense, you may acquit him of the
charge of aggravated assault.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person who is
lawfully in possession of real property or personal property or
who has a duty to protect such property which belongs to someone
else may not use force against another which is likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury to said other person in order to
prevent or terminate that person's interference with such
property.

